by Glenn P. Hastedt and Anthony J. Eksterowicz

The first months of a new presidency are a unique time in American politics. It is a period of great presidential activism, with appointments and policy initiatives announced on almost a daily basis. It is a "honeymoon" period, when the president's relationships with Congress and the media are at least cordial if not deferential. It is a period when campaign promises come due and domestic politics are on everyone's mind. It can also be a period of great frustration as newly elected presidents struggle with recalcitrant staffs and large, unfamiliar bureaucracies.
It is also a period in which foreign policy challenges and opportunities may arise that demand a presidential response. The extent to which a successful response is crafted heavily depends upon the planning and learning that takes place in advance, during the transition from one administration to another. This period, from the first Tuesday in November until January 20, lasts precisely eleven weeks.

The 2000 presidential election represents a unique challenge for transition efforts. Due to the uncertainty of the electoral vote, open transition efforts were highly criticized. For example, George W. Bush sought to create an image of leadership by openly discussing his possible Cabinet choices in the days immediately following the undecided election--discussions criticized by the media as premature.1 What such criticism did not recognize, however, is that transition efforts in modern presidential campaigns begin well before Election Day.

The concern over presidential transitions is relatively new, and their consequences for the conduct of American foreign policy have gone largely unexamined. Far more attention is given to the impact of presidential personality, bureaucratic politics, and small-group decision-making procedures. To address this void in the literature, we examine the problems and pitfalls associated with modern presidential transitions as they specifically apply to the making of foreign policy. We argue that a three-part transition syndrome exists in the area of foreign policy that has serious consequences for the conduct of American diplomacy. We conclude by presenting lessons aimed at alleviating the problems encountered by modern presidential administrations in transition.